During the hearing held at the Italian Constitutional Court, the lawyer Corrado Caruso He delivered one of the harshest criticisms of the so-called Tajani Decree. In his oral argument, he classified the regulation as a “perfect pasticcio all'italiana”In a free translation, "a perfect Italian mess," or "a perfect Italian chaos."
The expression was used at the end of the intervention to summarize the legal assessment presented to the court.
The judgement analyzes the constitutionality of the changes introduced by Decree-Law No. 36 of 2025, later converted into Law No. 74 of 2025, which significantly altered the rules for recognizing Italian citizenship by descent.
Critique of the position of defending the State
During the argument, Caruso, who is a member of the Department of Legal Studies at University of BolognaHe directly criticized the position presented by the Italian State Attorney's Office.
According to him, the state's own defense ended up recognizing that the descendants would not be entitled to citizenship, but only to a legal expectation linked to the beginning of an administrative or judicial process.
The lawyer ironically thanked her for this formulation and stated that it reveals the true nature of the argument presented by the State.
"I am very grateful to the State Attorney's Office, because these statements constitute an emblematic moment of frankness that ends up revealing the true dimension of the contested rule," said the lawyer.
Conflict with Italian case law
Caruso argued that this interpretation directly conflicts with the established understanding of Italian courts.
According to him, the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court itself has affirmed for decades that citizenship transmitted by descent constitutes a perfect and imprescriptible subjective right.
"The right to citizenship and its transmission has been reconstructed by jurisprudence as a perfect subjective right, which does not depend on discretionary decisions by the administration," said Caruso.
In this logic, the administrative procedure does not create the right. It only legally recognizes an already existing situation.
Critique of the retroactive application of the rule
Another central point of the argument was the criticism of the retroactive application of the new discipline.
Caruso stated that the State's own defense admits that there is a legal expectation regarding the recognition of citizenship. According to the lawyer, this corresponds to the principle of legitimate expectation.
"What is a legal expectation if not the subjective expression of the principle of legitimate expectation?", he asked.
He emphasized that this principle was built over more than a century of legislation and judicial decisions that recognized the automatic transmission of Italian citizenship.
Critique of administrative performance
During his defense, Caruso also criticized administrative practices adopted by Italian consulates over the years.
According to him, many requests for recognition of citizenship were stuck on waiting lists, without a response from consular authorities.
According to the lawyer, these situations should be considered valid requests for recognition.
"Isn't a request for an appointment that is ignored by the administration already a request for recognition?", he asked again.
He also cited recurring problems in digital systems and scheduling suspensions which, according to his argument, ended up preventing the analysis of thousands of requests.
Criticism of the legislator
In the final part of his argument, Caruso stated that the legislator adopted the harshest possible solution to deal with the issue.
According to him, there were less restrictive legal alternatives, such as transitional rules or the preservation of claims already filed.
None of these solutions were adopted. "The legislator chose the most disproportionate solution possible," he said.
Upon concluding his intervention, the lawyer summarized his criticism in one sentence addressed to the Court.
"The legislator created a perfect Italian-style pasta, which this Court is now called upon to remedy," he concluded.
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