* By Luigi Minari
The Italian State cannot deny citizenship jure sanguinis (by right of blood) to those who acquired another citizenship by birth abroad. This form of exclusion constitutes de facto discrimination, incompatible with the constitutional, European and international principles governing human dignity and equality before the law.
At the heart of Italian legal identity lies a principle as ancient as it is essential: jus sanguinis. Anyone descended from Italian citizens is, by original right, an Italian citizen. This is not a gracious concession by the State, but an intrinsic legal recognition, written into the very normative DNA of the Republic.
However, the recent Decree-Law No. 36/2025 challenges this principle by introducing an unjustifiable distinction between descendants with exclusive citizenship and those with multiple citizenship. The text provides that descendants of Italians born abroad who hold another citizenship will not automatically be considered Italian citizens, except under specific conditions. This is a penalty aimed mainly at those born in countries that apply the ius alone, such as the United States, Argentina or Brazil.
This measure not only represents indirect discrimination, but also blatantly violates the principle of substantial equality enshrined in Article 3 of the Italian Constitution. Furthermore, it conflicts with Article 22 of Law No. 91/1992, which prohibits the loss of citizenship when this leads to statelessness. Citizenship, therefore, must be analyzed in the relationship between the individual and the Italian State — and not in light of the existence of a second passport.
The urgency that does not exist
Even more serious is the fact that this decree is not urgent — an essential condition for the legitimate use of the decree-law instrument. The alleged “excess” of citizenship applications does not constitute a national emergency. It is a predictable phenomenon, growing over the years, and which has never been treated with the necessary seriousness.
The Italian government, far from taking action to expand and modernize consular services — which have accumulated waiting lists of up to 15 years in some countries — has chosen to restrict rights rather than expand its service capacity. This deliberate omission reveals a political choice: to ignore its own citizens abroad while promoting discourses of selective national identity.
The Spanish example
In this context, it is worth looking at Spain, which has followed the opposite path. Through the so-called Democratic Memory Law, the Spanish government has actively encouraged the recognition of citizenship to descendants of Spanish emigrants. The logic is clear: to welcome, include, and rebuild historical and cultural ties with its diaspora. In doing so, Spain recognizes that citizenship is more than a legal bond — it is a bridge between generations, continents, and cultures.
Citizenship is not a privilege
The Court of Justice of the European Union, in the decision Rottmann (C-135/08), has already stated that national citizenship cannot be revoked without considering its impact on the rights derived from European citizenship. Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case Genovese v. Malta (No. 53124/09), guaranteed that even those born outside the territory have the right to equal treatment.
Some try to justify the measure based on the theory of genuine link — the “genuine bond” between person and State — originated in the case Nottebohm (ICJ, 1955). But this theory applies exclusively to international law between States, not to internal bonds of citizenship. Italy has consciously and deliberately adopted the jus sanguinis as the basis of its legislation. To now invoke subjective criteria to deny it represents a legal and institutional inconsistency.
Respected authors such as Paul Weis and Peter Spiro have already warned that the genuine link does not apply to systems that provide for the automatic transmission of citizenship. And the European Court itself, in the Karassev v. Finland case, made it clear: citizenship is a fundamental right, which cannot be restricted on the basis of arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations.
A pact of belonging
Whether the Italian State recognizes the right to citizenship jure sanguinis even after generations, it cannot now restrict it on the basis of identity or sociological criteria. This would mean breaking with the normative coherence of the Republic and undermining the trust of citizens — inside and outside Italy — in the institutions.
As the jurist Giovanni Pugliese wrote, “citizenship cannot be reduced to a prize for those who resemble the ideal citizen, but is a responsibility of the State towards those who are born of it.” And, as such, one cannot be less Italian for also being Brazilian, Argentine or American.
What is at stake is not just a passport. It is respect for a pact of belonging that transcends time, borders and blood.
Luigi Minari is a lawyer registered with the Brazilian Bar Association, São Paulo Section, a Portuguese lawyer before the Faro Council and an Italian avvocato stabilito at the Bari Forum.
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